We consider the recent novel two-step estimator of Iaryczower and Shum (2012) , who analyze voting decisions of US Supreme Court justices. Motivated by the underlying theoretical voting model, we suggest that where the data under consideration displays variation in the common prior, estimates of the structural parameters based on their methodology should generally benefit from including interaction terms between individual and time covariates in the first stage whenever there is individual heterogeneity in expertise. We show numerically, via simulation and re-estimation of the US Supreme Court data, that the first order interaction effects that appear in the theoretical model can have an important empirical implication.
How individuals and groups make decisions under uncertainty is important in many areas of economics and political economy, and numerous theoretical models emphasize that decision makers can differ both in terms of their knowledge of an underlying state of the world and their preferences.
1 A key challenge for taking these models to data is to estimate the decision-making parameters and understand, quantitatively, the role played by different factors in decision making. Iaryczower and Shum (2012) (hereafter IS) have proposed an empirical voting model and a novel procedure for estimating the voting behavior of US Supreme Court justices. IS consider a framework in which each justice has to vote for the Plaintiff or Defendant, based on the observed evidence and his private interpretation of the law and other specifics of the case. Specifically, each justice is allowed to differ in his ideology, or bias (π it ), as well as in his ability to interpret the law and the specifics of the case (θ it ). This decision problem is based on the theoretical voting model of Duggan and Martinelli (2001) , and can be applied to other voting games (e.g. Iaryczower et al. (2013) or Hansen et al. (2014) ).
IS estimate (π it , θ it ) in two steps. In each period, a binary, unobserved state is realized; in one, the law favors the Plaintiff and in another it favors the Defendant.
The first step is to estimate the probability that justices vote for the Plaintiff in both states, controlling for justice and case covariates. The second is to recover the parameters of interest by solving the structural equations imposed by the equilibrium condition of the voting game. This note proposes a simple way that can help improve their estimates. Whenever justices differ in their ability θ it to perceive the state, which is typical of most interesting voting problems, the theoretical model predicts that justices will display heterogeneous responses across cases in terms of how much information they require to vote for the Plaintiff. To capture this behav-ior empirically, we propose including interaction terms in the first stage estimation.
Monte Carlo simulation exercises illustrate that the interaction terms can play an important role empirically, and a re-estimation of the Supreme Court data supports the simulation results.
Estimation of Structural Model
This section presents the empirical model IS propose, and motivates why it may be empirically useful to explicitly allow justices with heterogeneous ability to react differently to changes in common prior beliefs that the decision should favor the Plaintiff. For brevity and notational simplicity we only consider the sincere voting version of the model.
Model
For each case t there is a common unobserved state ω t ∈ {0, 1}, unknown to every decision marker and the econometrician, that equals 1 if the law in case t favors the Plaintiff and 0 if it favors the Defendant. ω t is drawn from a Bernoulli prior distribution with Pr [ ω t = 1 ] = ρ t . Each justice i has to make a binary decision v it ∈ {0, 1}-where 1 (0) is a vote for the Plaintiff (Defendant)-based on a private signal s it = ω t + σ it ε t with ε t ∼ N (0, 1). An appropriate measure of expertise in this setting is θ it = σ −1 it , which measures justice i's ability to infer the state.
Justices' payoffs are state dependent and parametrized by π it ∈ (0, 1). All justices get a payoff of 0 if their vote matches the state. Justice i gets payoff −π it when v it = 1 and ω t = 0, and − (1 − π it ) when v it = 0 and ω t = 1. π it is essentially a bias parameter that captures a justice's inclination to favor the Plaintiff: when it is close to 0 (1), the justice has a strong leaning to the Plaintiff (Defendant), while an unbiased justice has π it = 0.5.
Given this setup, it can be shown that justice i chooses v it = 1 if and only if
Bayes' Rule allows one to express
The normal distribution satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, which Duggan and Martinelli (2001) show implies the optimal voting rule is characterized by a threshold crossing condition. Specifically, by combining (1) and (2), it follows that v it = 1 if and only if
Letting s * it denote s * (θ it , σ it , ρ t ), the equilibrium probability of voting high in state
, where Φ is the normal cdf.
Expressed in this way, the voting rule (3) makes clear that justices with different expertise have heterogenous responses to changes in ρ t . The voting rule of a justice with very high expertise will be nearly unaffected by a change in ρ t . Since the signal is very accurate, he disregards the prior whatever its value in deciding the vote. On the other hand, the voting behavior of a justice with low expertise will be much more affected by changes in ρ t . So, it is potentially important to allow, as a first order effect, for such heterogeneity in estimating voting probabilities.
The likelihood of observing the vector of votes
Given γ it,0 and γ it,1 , θ it and s * it can be recovered via
. (5) The bias parameter π it relates to all other variables in the model according to (3).
Therefore one can recover (θ it , π it ) if ρ t , γ it,0 , and γ it,1 are known.
Methodology
For some observable characteristics of the cases X t and the justices Z it , IS consider the following reduced form parametric terms that mimic the theoretical parameters above:
, and γ it,1 can be estimated in the first stage from the maximum likelihood estimators of α, β, γ, δ, ζ, and η that maximize the natural logarithm of
Then in the second stage θ it and π it can be obtained from solving the structural relationships in (4) and (5).
In order to allow for first order heterogenous effects for changes in s * it with respect to ρ t , we propose an additional vector of a simple interaction terms W it between elements of X t and Z it be included in the reduced form parametric terms in the first stage. More concretely, replace γ it,0 and γ it,1 with
Following the theoretical model, we expect W it to play a particularly important role in empirical problems where there is a large degree of heterogeneity in justices'
expertise.
Evaluating the importance of the interaction terms
In order to develop an intuition for how the IS methodology may generally benefit from the inclusion of interaction terms we first present some results from a small Monte Carlo study. We then replicate and re-estimate the structural parameters for the US Supreme Court voting data used in IS.
Monte Carlo
In order to test the extent to which the inclusion of interaction terms matters for the estimation of voting games, we:
1. Generate a group of 9 decision makers (the size of the Court), each making 150 independent decisions over time. , and 
as defined in section 2.
3. Given these data, we construct X t = (1, ρ t ) and 4. After we obtain estimates of first-stage coefficients, we use the structural equations (3) and (5) to recover π it and σ it for j ∈ {A, B} as described above. We . Our findings do not change much. Numerical results are available upon request. We focus on estimation of σ rather than θ since the parameterization of the normal distribution in terms of its standard deviation is more common in many settings.
3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation is done in R with the BFGS algorithm; code is available on request.
4 This section focuses on the key results of the simulations, full results available on request. We also plot the complete distribution of the simulation results when σ B −σ A = 0 and when σ B − σ A = 0.8 in figure 2. With no σ differences, the results from both specifications are again very similar. But even at relatively modest expertise differences, the results show that not only does the inclusion of interaction terms ensure that the results stay anchored around the true parameters, but also that the distribution around the estimates is less dispersed too.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
US Supreme Court Data
We take data from IS that contains the vote of every justice (31 in total) on every case from . IS run separate regressions on four subsets of cases according to the issue at stake (business, basic rights, criminal, federalism). We focus on the results for economics and basic rights cases, the two subsets IS treat as their baseline cases.
5 The representation of this quantity as 1−π π is a very common, but ultimately arbitrary, modelling choice. One could for example model the quantity as
for any positive monotonic function g, and clearly change the magnitude of the estimated π while leaving invariant the ratio. Since the effect of interaction terms only matters when there is meaningful variation in the prior ρ t , it is important to quantify its range in the data. Figure 3 plots histograms of the estimated priors from specification (FS:IS) (the results with (FS:ALT) are very similar), and shows they range from around 0.3 to around 0.9, with a fairly dispersed distribution. This variation in the prior suggests, along with heterogeneity in justices' expertise, that interaction terms may play an important role in describing voting behaviour of judges in this dataset.
Our two specifications each produce 31 estimates (corresponding to the number of justices) of 1−π π and σ for business and rights cases. Table 1 displays a number of summary statistics related to the distributions of these estimates. The simulation exercise above shows that not explicitly controlling for heterogeneous effects that exist across judges and cases tends to inflate estimated differences between decision makers. This is consistent with our estimates using the US Supreme Court data. As the table shows, the inclusion of the interaction terms reduces justice heterogeneity both in terms of variances and ranges. For rights case this reduction is particularly notable: the variance from the specification with interaction terms is around one sixth the value of the variance without.
[ Table 1 about here.]
6 We perform this re-estimation since IS do not report the median value of the structural parameters across all values of the fitted priors.
7 We do not interact the mean value of other justices' Segal-Cover ideology or quality scorescovariates within X it -with any Z t variables, nor chief justice dummies-covariates within Z twith any X it variables. They remain included within X it and Z t , respectively. In order to capture the main theoretical property of the model that voters with heterogeneous ability react differently to changes in the common prior belief, we propose the inclusion of interaction terms between case and justice characteristics in the first stage reduced form estimation. This should help improve the estimates of the structural parameters, especially where voters differ in their expertise. We perform some Monte Carlo studies and re-estimate the US Supreme Court data used in IS to support our estimation approach.
Finally, we end with some remarks to emphasize that we are not simply advocating making the reduced-form estimation in the first stage as flexible as possible, either by artificially including more regressors (of higher order terms) or, in the extreme, taking a completely nonparametric approach. While a more flexible specification in the first stage is appealing theoretically from the point of robustness, it may lead to more biased and imprecise estimates in the second stage, especially in finite samples. In contrast, our motivation for the inclusion of interaction terms is led by an inherent implication of voting models when voters are heterogeneous. Our numerical results show that imposing such theory-driven structure can significantly improve the structural estimates. Hence a broader message is that economic theory can be used to help inform the specification of the reduced-form component of two-step estimators in structural models. 
